Abstract This paper presents a spatially distributed and dynamic billing, pricing and allocation mechanism for which a user terminal requires Cognitive Radio abilities. That is, the Cognitive Radio abilities will be applied to the economical environment. The radio resource goods are allocated to the users by a multi-unit sealed-bid auction. Intelligent entities like the bidding strategy have to represent operator's and users' behavior and to make decisions for them in order to fulfill the preferences and QoS. The main functionalities, used to execute the dynamic auction sequence and located in the MAC are described, assuming the entities possess Cognitive Radio abilities.
future, these radios will recognize and observe their environment and learn about it. The learning process results in modified actions and adaption to the environment. This cognition and the following execution can be realized in a Cognitive Radio [1] . One of the first steps towards a cognitive radio will be introduced in this paper by simultaneously allocating spectrum and determining the price per bandwidth in periodically repeated auctions.
In established billing systems the prices are fixed and the customers who demand first will be served first. Auctions allow the customers to incorporate their needs and demands instantaneously into the good allocation at the current market situation. Therefore, the price depends on the willingness of a customer to pay for goods currently offered. Clearly, the auctioneer has the possibility to influence the market situation by announcing a reserved price. Each bid has to exceed this limitation in order to be accepted to the auction. Both sides, thus, have the opportunity to influence the market progress in real time.
Medium access control mechanisms can be divided in deterministic and statistical. One well-known representation of the last mechanism is ALOHA and its modified kind slotted-ALOHA [2] . On the other hand, several deterministic access mechanisms are proposed in order to avoid access interference. Besides the CSMA/CD [3] and CSMA/CA [4], mechanisms were proposed based on periodically repeated auctions. The so-called Resource Auction Multiple Access (RAMA) [5] [6] [7] is based on sequential sealed-bid singleunit auction which can be improved by using a multiunit sealed-bid auction. In contrast to RAMA for which the bids have no intention because of being randomly chosen, D-RAMA [8] allows to weigh the bids based on the buffer size of the proper service class. The aim is to reach a better quality of service. These protocols do not allow users to incorporate their purchase power, the experience of the past and additional information of the future.
The access and assignment mechanism proposed in this paper, allows users to express their needs, urgency to send, preferences, purchase power combined with a QoS-aware buffer management which categorized the data according to their urgency to send in order to fulfill the QoS criteria. The auction mechanism will be applied to offer Radio Resource Goods (RRGs) to users and allocate it after the auction. A multi-unit auction [9] assigns these spectrum parts to users according to their bids and at the same time determines the price depending on the bids and the auctioneer's reserved price. Hence, the auction mechanism incorporates both spectrum allocation and billing.
Since the repetition duration should be very small like seconds or even milliseconds, signaling effort represents a very important constraint concerning the type of auctions used for the resource allocation in wireless communication systems. Auction types like open auctions and sequential auctions [9] are not suitable, because the undetermined number of iterations leads to an unpredictable auction duration. On the other hand, the sealed-bid auctions are very fast. The auction duration is only a linear function of the number of bidders. The signaling commands are short and can be piggybacked into some free space of the header or the data packets. Therefore, the sealed-bid auction can be implemented under heavy time and signaling constraints. This paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the MAC using auctions. The proposed system and especially the bidding strategy, reserve price calculation and the auction mechanism are described in Sections 3-6. Finally, simulation results will illustrate the behavior of this system in Section 7.
Auctions as MAC entities
In communication systems, the operator represents the auctioneer's side and the users are the bidders. The Economic Manager (EM) responsible for the auction is logically located in the Medium Access Control layer (MAC) of a Radio Access Technology (RAT) in each cell and controls the bandwidth allocation by auctions. Its counterpart is located in the MAC-layer of the user terminal. The Radio Resource Goods (RRGs) offered which can be bandwidths f leased for a certain time duration T. Every duration T an auction takes place in which the free RRGs are offered. In this auction both the currently served users and the new yet unserved users participate.
In such a highly dynamical process the user cannot bid by himself. An RRG Auction Agent (RAA) located in the MAC-layer should represent the bidder's behavior. This behavior has to be expressed in a form, which an algorithm can handle. Therefore, users wishes, demands and behaviors should be represented by a set of parameters or functions, see Section 4.3. Not only private information can influence the bidding strategy, but also the experience of past auctions. Since a user participates in several auctions, the information of past allocation and price development may be the input to a prediction algorithm in order to improve the bidding strategy, see Section 4.
On the operator's side an auctioneer's agent located in the proper MAC-layer represents the operator's behavior. Its tasks include the announcement of an auction every T time units, calculating and predicting the reserved price based on fixed costs and executing the auction mechanism.
EM and RAA act and react in a periodic auction sequence. In the past the focus in auction theory was mainly on auctions which occur once. This spectrum allocation approach needs a more sophisticated consideration of auctions. The auction sequence has to be considered as a dynamic process. The intention of maximizing expectations can be directly applied in this process, because a user takes part as often as his gain and his good allocation can be approximated by the expectations. Therefore, optimizing the bidding strategy with respect to the expectations makes sense.
From the economical point of view, this auction process is more suitable than established billing strategies concerning the operator's revenue in a frequently visited cell.
System description

Overview
A resource allocation method based on auctions will take place beyond 3G. The auction is located in the EM and will be executed by the subentity Auction Mechanism (AM), see Fig. 1 . The EM is logical located next to the Base Station (BS) within the MAC and is responsible for the RRGs allocation under economical aspects. The RRGs will be auctioned and the user who wins RRGs will get General Resource Elementary Credits (GRECs). Besides the EM at the operator's side, the RAA at the users' side comprises the three
